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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

vY
Case No. 870108-CA

STEVEN L. GRIFFIN,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are set
forth previously in Appellant's Brief (Brief of Appellant at 1-12).
Mr. Griffin takes this opportunity to reply to a portion of
Respondent's Brief.

Issues to which Mr. Griffin does not reply are

adequately covered in Appellant's opening brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should review the admissibility of Steven
Griffin's confessions. Mr. Griffin filed a motion to suppress both
confessions and an evidentiary hearing on that motion was held
before the trial judge. When the state attempted to introduce a
tape of the second confession, Mr. Griffin objected to the form of
the tape and later stipulated to the form without withdrawing his
objection to the admissibility.

This stipulation as to the form of

the tape and transcript should not preclude appellate review of the
admissibility of the confessions.

Mr. Griffin effectively invoked his right to counsel when
he stated "I'm calling an attorney."

This statement was an

unequivocal request which required that the officer cease
questioning.

Even if the statement were considered equivocal, the

following question and response did not clarify that request and the
officer should not have resumed interrogation.
Admission of a confession which is coerced or taken in
violation of the right to counsel is not harmless error.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF MR. GRIFFIN'S CONFESSIONS.
(Reply to Point I of Respondent's Brief)
A.

MR. GRIFFIN PRESERVED HIS OBJECTION TO THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE CONFESSIONS.

Mr. Griffin moved to suppress both the February 15, 1986
"sarcastic" confession made in the police car and the February 17,
1986 confession made at the jail (R. 160-61).

At trial, Mr. Griffin

did not renew his objection to the February 15 statement, nor did
defense counsel object to testimony regarding the February 17
confession.

Defense counsel did object when the state attempted to

play the tape of the February 17 confession (R. 419).
In State v. Johnson, No. 20814, slip op., (Utah 1987)
(filed December 31, 1987), the Utah Supreme Court held that a
defendant is not required "to object or renew his motion to suppress
at the trial where the trial judge is also the judge who ruled on
the pretrial motion and where the record or transcript indicates
that an evidentiary hearing was held."

- 2 -

Id., slip opinion at 3.

In the present case, the Honorable Dean E. Conder, Third
District Court, presided over the evidentiary hearing on the motion
to suppress the confessions and the trial. Hence, an objection to
the admissibility of the confessions at trial was not necessary.
In light of the decision in State v. Johnson, the state's
reliance on State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983) and State v.
Holyoak, 67 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (Ct. App. 1987) is misplaced.
B.

REVIEW OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF FEBRUARY 17
CONFESSION SHOULD NOT BE PRECLUDED BY DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S STIPULATION TO THE FORM IN WHICH
THE TAPE AND TRANSCRIPT WERE ADMITTED.

When the state attempted to introduce the tape of the
February 17 confession, defense counsel objected (R. 419). An off
the record discussion at the side bar followed (R. 419). The Court
then stated on the record "(T)here has been an offer of the exhibit
and the court will rule, I'll hold and reserve receiving that
exhibit right now and allow counsel to work out something during the
lunch hour on that particular exhibit" (R. 419-20).

After a recess

and further testimony, the court asked " . . . Exhibit 3 is the
discussion between the detective and the defendant at the jail and
may be stipulated, Exhibit 3 may be received?" (R. 434). Defense
counsel responded affirmatively (R. 434).
The state acknowledges that the version of the interview
presented to the jury was edited and speculates1 that defense

1

Respondent acknowledges in its brief at 20 that this line of
argument is speculation. See Respondent's Brief at 20.
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counsel changed his mind and stipulated to the edited version as a
tactical decision aimed at minimizing the ultimate impact by
convincing the jury to convict Mr. Griffin only "of the offenses to
which defendant confessed."

Respondent's Brief at 20. However, a

review of the proceedings as a whole shows that defense counsel
continued to object to the constitutionality of the February 17
confession.

The Motion to Suppress, the hearing thereon and defense

counsel's unrelinquishing examination of witnesses at trial in an
effort to point out both the involuntary nature of the confession
and the denial of Mr. Griffin's right to counsel (R. 436-40, 446-73,
513-14, 518-19, 591-93, 602-23) show that counsel did not change his
mind and choose to waive the constitutional argument as a tactical
decision .2
A review of the entire record shows that defense counsel
stipulated only to the form in which the jail interview was
admitted, not to the voluntariness of the confession nor the denial
of Mr. Griffin's right to counsel nor to the truth of the statements
contained in the tape.3

such a stipulation as to the form of

2

The State suggests that additional evidence of intercourse or
sodomy was edited before the tape of the jail interview was
presented to the jury. However, such speculation is not supported
by the record. Furthermore, Mr. Griffin stated in the version
presented to the jury that penetration occurred "may be slightly"
(R. 418, 616). Slight penetration is sufficient to sustain a
conviction for rape of a child. Hence the State's argument does not
fit the facts of this case.
3 The tape of the first interview involves discussions regarding
other possible victims. Although the record is sketchy on this
point, the second tape also contained discussion of activity with
other persons which needed to be deleted before presenting the tape
to the jury.
- 4
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evidence "is different from a stipulation of

what the facts are."

State v. Scandrett, 468 P.2d 639, 640 (Utah 1970).

The State's

reasoning could also be used to argue that based on the
"stipulation", Mr. Griffin agreed that

the statements contained in

the jail interview were true. However, the record read as a whole
shows that Mr. Griffin continued to assert his innocence and
challenge the admissibility of the confessions.
In claiming that review of the admissibility issue is
precluded by Mr. Griffin's limited stipulation to an edited version
of the tape recording and transcript of the confession, the State
relies exclusively on State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987).
However, Medina is neither persuasive nor controlling.

The decision

in State v. Medina, supra, is based on Rule 19(c) of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
case.

Such rule is inapplicable in the present

In asking the Court to rely on the Medina decision, the State

is asking this court to ignore the crucial distinction between
evidence received in violation of a constitutional protection and
the giving of jury instructions.
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed a
longstanding judgment "that some constitutional errors require
reversal without regard to the evidence in the particular case"
because they "render a trial fundamentally unfair".
478 U.S.

, 106 S.Ct.

Rose v. Clark,

, 92 L.Ed. 2d 460, 470 (1986).

Some

constitutional errors "are so fundamental and pervasive that they
require reversal without regard to the facts or circumstances of the
particular case."
S.Ct.

Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.

, 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 685 (1986).
- 5 -
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Two such constitutional

errors are the admission of a coerced confession and the denial of
the right to counsel.

See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23,

87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) citing Payne v. Arkansas, 356
U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct.792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963).
The highest court further explained:
[0]ur harmless error cases do not turn on whether
the defendant conceded the factual issue on which
the error bore. Rather, we have held that tfChapman
[v. California] mandates consideration of the
conviction for constitutional errors that may be
harmless."
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. _ _ , 106 S.Ct.

, 92 L.Ed.2d 460, 474

(1986), citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509, n. 7,
103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96, 106, n. 7 (1983)(emphasis added).
Mr. Griffin assigns error to the admission of the confessions on the
grounds that they were involuntary because coerced and that they
were taken in violation of his right to counsel.

(Brief of

Appellant at 13). Review of such constitutional error does not turn
on whether "the defendant conceded the factual issue on which the
error bore."

Rose v. Clark at 474.

The Utah Supreme Court stressed in both State v. Lesley,
672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983) and State v. Johnson, No. 20814 (Utah 1987)
(filed December 31, 1987) that the crucial factor is whether the
judge was aware of the objection and had an opportunity to consider
the admissibility issue. A review of this case as a whole shows
that the trial judge was aware of the objection and had a chance to
consider the admissibility

of the confessions.

In Johnson, the

evidence was challenged based on a Fourth Amendment search and
seizure argument.

Search and seizure issues unlike coerced
- 6 -

confessions and right to counsel issues have not been singled out as
the type of constitutional error fundamental to a fair trial in a
criminal proceeding.
In the present case where the same judge presided over
the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress and the trial and
defense counsel challenged the confessions through cross and direct
examination of witnesses throughout the trial, defense counsel's
limited stipulation to the form in which the confession was admitted
should not preclude appellate review.
However, in the event this Court is persuaded by the
State's argument that the stipulation as to the form in which the
evidence was admitted precludes appellate review, Mr. Griffin would
request that the matter be remanded to district court for a hearing
to determine the contents of the discussion at the bench regarding
the editing of the tape, and whether the trial judge believed that
counsel's objection to the admission of the confession on the
grounds of coercion and denial of right to counsel continued despite
the limited stipulation to the form in which the evidence was
presented.
C.

MR. GRIFFIN OBJECTED TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
BOTH STATEMENTS.

Two interviews of Mr. Griffin occurred in this case: one
on February 15, 1986 in the police car and one on February 17, 1986
in the jail.

At the motion to suppress, defense counsel stated in

his opening statement "I come before the Court on a motion to
suppress Mr. Griffin's confessions" (R. 160). Despite an

- 7

interruption by the state, defense counsel stated at the close of
his opening argument:
"And those are the grounds for our motion, one that
he was effectively deprived of his right to counsel
. . . (a)nd that the confession was coerced,
therefore, not voluntary."
The reporter did not transcribe the closing argument in the motion
hearing.
argument.

However, Steve Griffinfs claim is set forth in the opening
Any statement made following the request for counsel is

objected to on the grounds that Mr. Griffin's right to counsel was
violated,

in addition, Mr. Griffin objected to both the sarcastic

confession given on February 15 and the confession at the jail on
February 17, on the grounds that they were coerced.
As the state points out, the second confession was the
more damaging since it was more specific than the first, and the
officers acknowledged that the first was sarcastic, insincere and
invalid.

On February 15th, the coercion in the interview caused Mr.

Griffin to give a statement which the officers acknowledged was not
a true confession.

Where interview tactics lead to such a sarcastic

confession, coercion is implicit in those tactics.
While much of the coercion occurred during the first
interview,4* the effect of such coercion was cumulative.

A request

for an attorney which was ignored, followed by repetitive comments
regarding Mr. Griffin's need for counseling and the necessity of
confession in order to get treatment and stay with his family,

4

In footnote 12 of its brief at 27-28, the State states "defendant
deceptively cites to this court statements made during the first
interview which were by defendant's choice not before the trial
court at the suppression hearing." At the suppression hearing, the
following discussion occurred:
- 8 -

followed by two days without contact outside the jail and no
attorney followed by more coercive comments pressured Mr.
Griffin into making the February 17 statements.

Hence, Mr.

Griffin has objected throughout to the admissibility of both
confessions, arguing that they were coerced and denied him his
right to counsel.

4 cont.

COURT: Would the tape be the best evidence then?
MR. GARCIA: I suppose it would.
...

THE

•

• •

THE COURT: Well,let me get down to the nub of it. The
tape would be the answer wouldn't it?
MS. BEARSON: It would certainly be the best evidence.
THE COURT: Let's find out.
MR. GARCIA: Ask that the tape be played then
(R. 165)
The foregoing shows, contrary to the state's assertion, that defense
counsel did not choose to keep the tape from the Court and in fact
asked that it be played at the hearing.
In addition, the State asked that the entire tape be
played (R. 165). Furthermore, the Court received no objections to
its question "Any objections to admitting the tape as the evidence
of the conversation?" (R. 165). See Addendum A for complete
transcript of discussion regarding admission of the first tape.
Hence, it appears that the tape was admitted into evidence.
The portion of the tape which was played at the hearing
was not transcribed (R. 166). The tape began at "This is a lie.
I'm calling an attorney" and, as the state agrees, it is unclear at
what point the tape was turned off. Trial counsel for Mr. Griffin
believed that the remainder of the tape was played and in preparing
the modification, the appellate attorney read the transcript as
admitting the entire tape. In an effort to avoid any problem or
wasteful argument, a representative of the Legal Defender
Association's office met with a representative of the Attorney
General to go over the tape recording word by word in order to
ensure accuracy in the transcription. See Addendum B. After
defense counsel made every and any change requested by the Attorney
General's office, the State stipulated to the inclusion of such tape
and transcription in the record. See Addendum C. Only after the
foregoing review and stipulation did defense counsel file its Motion
to Modify Record on Appeal. See Addendum D.
Defense counsel has provided this Court with a copy of
the tape in the event that the Court should elect to listen and
decide which portion of said tape is appropriate for consideration
in this appeal. However, defense counsel had no intent to deceive
or mislead and simply placed the the tape and transcription into
evidence to complete the record.
- 9 -

POINT II. MR, GRIFFIN EFFECTIVELY INVOKED HIS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
Although State argues that Mr, Griffin's assertion, "I'm
calling an attorney" is not a clear request for the present
assistance of counsel (Resp. Brief at 23), neither Miranda nor any
of its progeny support this claim. In Edwards v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 885 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States
Supreme Court did not find such an ambiguity in the statement, "I
want an attorney before making a deal" which arguably implies future
intent much more so than Mr. Griffin's statement.

451 U.S. 477,

478, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (1981), rehearing denied, 69
L.Ed.2d 984, 101 S.Ct. 3128.

In fact, in Smith v. Illinois which

was cited by the State, the defendant's reply, "Uh, yea.

I'd like

to do that," to the question of whether he understood his right to
have a lawyer present during questioning was interpreted as an
unequivocal request for counsel. 469 U.S. at 93. The State,
therefore, asks this Court to find an ambiguity where the United
States Supreme Court has declined to do so.
After asserting that the statement "I'm calling an
attorney" was ambiguous, the State claims that Detective Strong's
next question and Mr. Griffin's answer clarified that ambiguity
(Resp. Brief at 24-25).

Detective Strong asked "[A]re ya saying you

don't want to talk anymore?"
Brief at 1.

See Addendum B to Appellant's Opening

Mr. Griffin replied, "No, I ain't saying that, I'm just

saying it's a lie, I am going to talk to an attorney."

Addendum B

to Appellant's Brief at 1.
Even if Mr. Griffin's initial request were ambiguous as
to when he intended to call an attorney, his subsequent statement
- 10 -

did not clear up that ambiguity and in fact, suggested again his
desire to consult with an attorney.
The State's position is unconvincing.

According to the

state, the statement, "I am going to talk to an attorney "is
considered an unambiguous limited request for counsel only in the
future, while the statement, "I'm calling an attorney" is considered
an ambiguous request.

Such a distinction in intent and clarity

offends both common sense and precedent.

The courts have recognized

a limited request for counsel when a defendant requests to speak
with a probation officer, Fare v.Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S.Ct.
2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197, rehearing denied 100 S.Ct. 186, 62 L.Ed.2d 121
(1979), or when a defendant requests to speak with one specific
attorney, Griffin v. Lynaugh, 823 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1987), but has
never recognized a definite limited request only for counsel in the
future from any statement even remotely similar to Mr. Griffin's.
If Mr. Griffin's initial request for counsel is considered by this
Court to be ambiguous, such ambiguity was not clarified by Detective
Strong's next question nor Mr. Griffin's response.

Detective Strong

violated Mr. Griffin's right to counsel by continuing with the
interrogation without clarifying the request for counsel.
In its brief the state fails to address the admissibility
of the jail confession based on the request for counsel during the
February 15 interview in

the police car.

In footnote 11, the state

argues "that defendant also failed to invoke his right to counsel
during the second interview."
25-26.

Footnote 11, Respondent's brief at

In making such a statement, the state misapprehends the
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applicable law.

After the initial, unclarified request, Mr. Griffin

was not required to reinvoke his right to counsel in order to
preserve that right. Nor did he withdraw the invocation of that
right when, according to Detective Strong, he was readvised of his
Miranda rights and expressed willingness to talk.
[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have
counsel present during custodial interrogation, a
valid waiver of that right cannot be established by
showing only that he responded to further
police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he
has been advised of his rights. . . . [A]n accused,
such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal
with the police only through counsel, is not subject
to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the
accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police.
State v. Newton, 682 P.2d 295, 297 (Utah 1984), quoting Edwards, 451
U.S. at 484-485. Like the defendant in Edwards, Mr. Griffin did not
validly waive the right he had validly exercised two days prior.
The State does not argue that Mr. Griffin initiated the conversation
at the jail on February 17, 1986. Neither does the State claim that
Mr. Griffin knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel
at that time. The State argues solely that Mr. Griffin did not
invoke his right to counsel on February 17, 1986, failing to address
the pivotal question of whether Mr. Griffin's invocation two days
prior had been waived or honored.
Mr. Griffin effectively invoked his right to counsel on
February 15, 1986, with the statement, "I'm calling an attorney."
See Addendum B to Appellant's opening brief at 1.

Having thus

invoked his right, and any unlikely ambiguity remaining unclarified,
the State was required to show that Mr. Griffin initiated further
- 12 -

communication, waived his right knowingly and intelligently, and
spoke voluntarily for the confession at issue to be admissible.
State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1986).

Because the State

made no such showing, the trial court erred in admitting the
confession.
POINT III. THE ADMISSION OF MR. GRIFFIN'S
CONFESSIONS CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.
(Reply to Respondent's Point II).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that there is a
presumption that constitutional error is prejudicial, "but that it
can be overcome when the court is convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that it had no such prejudicial effect upon the proceedings."
State v. Scandrett, 468 P.2d 639, 643 (Utah 1970).

In Chapman v.

California, supra at 23, the United States Supreme Court stated:
In fashioning a harmless-constitutional- error rule,
we must recognize that harmless-error rules can work
very unfair and mischievous results when, for
example, highly important and persuasive evidence,
or argument, though legally forbidden finds its way
into a trial in which a question of guilt or
innocence is a close one."
The Chapman Court cited with approval its statement in
Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86, 87, 845 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d
171, 173 (1963) that "the question is whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed
to the conviction" and acknowledged that the state has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a federal constitutional
error is harmless before the appellate court can embrace such a
finding.

Id. at 24.
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As discussed above under Point I of this Reply Brief at
5-6/ the United States Supreme Court has held that some kinds of
constitutional error can never be harmlessf two of which are present
in the instant case:

admission of a coerced confession and the

denial of the right to counsel.
Even lacking these exceptions to the harmless error
doctrine/ it is difficult to imagine a piece of evidence which would
contribute more to the jury's decision or have a greater impact on
the outcome of a trial than a confession by the accused that he
committed the crime. Arguablyf a confession would erase any
reasonable doubt the jury might have as to a defendant's guilt. Mr.
Griffin's confessions were not harmless since it is probable that
they contributed to the jury's decision/ and it is likely that in
absence of such evidence, the jury would have reached a different
verdict.

This likelihood is demonstrated with chilling emphasis in

the words of a juror in response to the jury poll as to whether the
guilty verdict reflected her decision, "Oh/ I'm just having a really
hard time how I feel.

Uh—yes f I guess."

(R. 702).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant/ Steven L.
Griffin/ requests that this Court reverse his conviction for Sexual
Abuse of a Child and remand the case to the district court with an
order that both confessions be suppressed, and for a new trial or
dismissal of the charges.
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ADDENDUM A

questions in a leading fashion by stating the answer and
then asking if that isn't true.
objection is sustained.

That's leading.

The

Let's get to the nubbin of this.

Was there a tape at the time of the conversation?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

Yes, your Honor.

Have you listened to that tape,

Mr. Garcia?
MR. GARCIA:
THE COURT:

Yes.

I have.

And does he request an attorney on

that tape?
MR. GARCIA:

Yes. He does.

Q

(By Mr. Garcia)

A

Not that I recall, no.
THE COURT:

Did he request an attorney?

WDuld the tape be the best evidence

then?
MR. GARCIA:

I suppose it would.

You're denying

that he says I want to talk to an attorney?
THE WITNESS:

I don't recall that.

I certainly

would have stopped questioning had he.
Q

(By Mr. Garcia)

Isn't it true, you didn't stop

the questioning until you stopped it some time after that—
quite awhile after that?
MS. BEARNSON:

Well, again, your Honor, this is

leading.
THE COURT: Well, let me get down to the nub of

\\£A

1 it.

The tape would be the answer, wouldn't it?
MS. BEARNSON:

2

It would certainly be the best

3 evidence.
4

THE COURT:

5

MR. GARCIA:

Ask that the tape be played then.

6

THE COURT:

Have you listened to it, Mr. Garcia?

7

MR. GARCIA:

Let's find out.

Yes.

I have. And I made notes of it

8 and I —
9

THE COURT:

Did you make a note of where that

10 statement was made?
MR. GARCIA:

11

I could find it very easily.

I made

12 notes of everything that was said and I could get to that
13 spot in just a couple of seconds.
THE COURT:

14

Any objections to admitting the tape

15 as the evidence of the conversation?
MS. BEARNSON:

16

No, your Honor. Would ask that the

17 tape be played in its entirety.
18

THE COURT:

Well, I don't want to sit here and

19

listen to the entire part of it. It's only part of it

20

that's in.'issue here. Why shouldn't we just hear that part?

21
22

MS. BEARNSON:

long as that part is heard in its context.

23
24 play?
25

That would be fine, your Honor, so

THE COURT:

Sure.

Have you got it here so we can

I have a recorder. .
THE WITNESS:

Yes, sir.

7

oooi'6'o

1I

THE COURT:

All right, Mr. Garcia.

Let's get down

2 I to earth on here, no use going all the way around the
3 mulberry bush on this.
4

MR. GARCIA:

5

THE COURT:

6

I can certainly find it.
Take a minute for recess and let both

of you get together and find where it is and listen to this

7 tape.
8

(Whereupon, the recess was taken.)

9

MR. GARCIA:

10 that, your Honor.
11

Q

Sorry I wasn't better prepared for

But we found the point in question.

(By Mr. Garcia)

Officer, would you play that

12 part?
13

(Whereupon, the officer turned the tape recording

14

on, and it started out with a statement, "This is a lie.

15

I'm calling an attorney."

16

MR. GARCIA:

'7

point, Mr. Griffin—

'8

THE COURT:

19

Et cetera.

Your Honor, it's obvious at that

Before we get to that, any further

evidence?

20

MR. GARCIA: Yes.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. GARCIA:

23

Had he been given his Miranda rights?
He had been right before this

beginning, yes.

24
25

Et cetera.)

THE COURT:
Q

Any further evidence?

(By Mr. Garcia)

Officer, this conversation then

oooi&s

ADDENDUM B

SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
333 SOUTH SECOND EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
532-5444
Felony-Misdemeanor Divisions
F JOHN HILL
Director

BOARD OF TRUSTEES
ROBERT VAN SC1VER
Chairman

0. GILBERT ATHAY
Ex-Officio

LIONEL FRANKEL
JIMI MITSUNAGA
IRENE NIELSEN
RAY GROUSSMAN
STEWART HANSON, Jr.
LON HINDE
JAY LOWE
JOHN O'CONNELL
JOSEPH! A. GETER

J u l y 2 2 , 1987

Mr* Timothy Shea
Court of Appeals
230 South 500 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Re:

State v. Griffin
Appeal No. 870108-CA

Dear Mr* Shea:
Enclosed is Appellant's Motion to Modify the Record in the
above case. As we discussed on the telphone on July 20, 1987, the
court reporter in the trial court did not take down or transcribe a
tape which was played into evidence at the motion to suppress
hearing and relied upon by the trial court in making its ruling.
Our office obtained a copy of the tape from the detective who
recorded it and transcribed the appropriate portion. The transcript
is attached to our motion as Exhibit "A".
A representative from the Attorney General's office has
reviewed the tape and transcript, and that office has stipulated to
including the transcript in the record on appeal. I am also
requesting that the tape itself be placed into evidence in the event
the Court would like to listen to the relevant portions. The
Attorney General's office has also stipulated to the inclusion of
the tape in the record.

Mr. Timothy Shea
Page Two
July 22, 1987
My understanding is that the motion and stipulation from
opposing counsel are all that is necessary to insure the inclusion
of the transcript of the tape in the record on appeal. If there is
anything further which we must do, please let me know as soon as
possible. Our brief in this case is due next Monday, July 27, 1987
and we anticipate that we will file the brief at that time without
requesting further extensions unless we encounter some difficulty in
including this transcript in the record.
Please call me if you have any questions.
Very truly yours,

Joan C. Watt
Appellate Attorney
JCW/kj
Enc.

ADDENDUM C

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PROPOSED MODIFICATION
OF RECORD

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
STEVEN L. GRIFFIN,

Case No. 870108-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
Pursuant to the attached Motion to Modify Record on Appeal,
Appellant proposes the following modification of the record.
1.

The tape recording attached hereto, a portion of which

was played into evidence at the motion to suppress hearing held on
May 23, 1986 be admitted into evidence as part of the record.
2.

The transcript of such tape, beginning at the line

"This is a lie. I am calling an attorney." as set forth in Exhibit
A, attached hereto and incorporated by this reference thereto,
supplement the record at page R. 166.
STIPULATION
I have read the foregoing Motion to Modify Record and
Proposed Modification of Record and hereby stipulate to including
such-tape and transcription in the record.

ATTORNEY GENERAL
Delivered/Mailed a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this M

day of July, 1987.

ADDENDUM D

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

:
:

v.

:

STEVEN L. GRIFFIN/

:

Defendant/Appellant.

APPELLANT'S MOTION TO
MODIFY RECORD ON APPEAL

Case No. 870108-CA

:

Pursuant to Rule 11(h) of the Rules of the Utah Court of
Appeals, appellant/ Steven L. Griffin, by and through counsel, JOAN
C. WATT and MANNY GARCIA/ moves the court to supplement the record
in the above-captioned case to include the evidence omitted from the
transcript as set forth in the proposed modification of record
attached hereto and, if necessary, order that a supplemental record
be certified and transmitted.

This motion is made on the following

grounds:
1.

At the Motion to Suppress hearing held in the trial

court May 23, 1986/ Defendant/Appellant played a tape recording into
evidence.

The court considered such tape in reaching its decision.

2.

The court reporter in the trial court did not

transcribe the recording as part of the record.

In addition, the

court reporter informed counsel for appellant that he did not take
notes on such tape and was therefore-unable to transcribe such tape.
3.

Counsel for appellant obtained a copy of such tape from

Detective Strong, the Detective who made such recording. The
attached proposed modification is a transcription of such tape,
beginning with portion indicated on page R. 166 of the record in the
above-captioned case.

4.

The transcript of such recording is material to the

Appellant's argument on appeal.
DATED this

CI

day of July, 1987.

^dM.^P .u£b/
JOAN C . WATT

Attorney for Appellant

z.

MANNY GARCIA

Attorney for Appellant
Delivered/Mailed a copy of the foregoing to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114,
this

r% 1

day of July, 1987.

